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IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES: PART II
Paul C. Giannelli
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
This is the second of two articles on the impeachment
of witnesses.
CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Ohio Evidence Rule 404(A) prohibits the use of character evidence unless one of three enumerated exceptions
applies. The third exception provides: "Evidence of the
character of a witness on the issue of credibility is admissible as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609." Possible
means by which a witness' untruthful character might be
shown are reputation evidence, opinion evidence, and
evidence of specific instances of conduct. Rule 608(A)
permits the use of reputation and opinion evidence. Rule
608(8) permits the use of specific instances of conduct
which did not result in conviction, so long as the
evidence is clearly probative of untruthful character. Rule
609 deals with the admissibility of prior convictions.
OPINION AND REPUTATION EVIDENCE
Rule 608(A) permits the use of opinion and reputation
evidence to show a witness' character for untruthfulness.
In this context, character is used circumstantially; a
person with a poor character for truth and veracity is
more likely to testify untruthfully than a person with a
good character for truth and veracity. See also Rule
803(20) (recognizing a hearsay exception for reputation
evidence concerning character).
impeachment under Rule 608 is limited to the character trait of untruthfulness. See Staff Note ("only evidence
relating to veracity is admissible."). This limitation is
imposed in order "to sharpen relevancy, to reduce
surprise, waste of time, and confusion, and to make the
lot ofthe witness somewhat less unattractive." Advisory
Committee's Note, Fed. Evid. R. 608. This aspect of Rule
608 is consistent with prior Ohio law. In State v. Scott, 61
Ohio St.2d 155, 400 N.E.2d 375 (1980), the Supreme
Court held: "In impeaching the credibility of a witness,
inquiry into general reputation or character should be
restricted to reputation for truth and veracity." /d. (syllabus, para. 3). Accord, Craig v. State, 5 Ohio St. 605
(1854); State v. Agner, 30 Ohio App.2d 96, 283 N.E.2d

443 (Hancock 1972); Schueler v. Lynam, 80 Ohio App.
325, 75 N.E.2d 464 (Montgomery 1947). Thus, evidence
of a witness' general moral character is inadmissible.
See State v. Scott, 61 Ohio St.2d 155,400 N.E.2d 375
(1980).
It is the witness' character for truth and veracity at the
time of trial that is relevant. "Evidence as to such general
impeachment must relate to the time at which such
witness testified, or reasonably near thereto." Radke v.
State, 107 Ohio St. 399, 140 N.E. 586 (1923) (syllabus,
para. 2). See.a/so Hamilton v. State, 34 Ohio St. 82 (1877)
(reputation two years prior to trial admitted); McCormick,
Evidence§ 44 (3d ed. 1984).
The prior Ohio cases recognized the use of reputation
evidence to show untruthful character. See State v. Scott,
61 Ohio St.2d 155, 400 N.E.2d 375 (1980); Cowan v.
Kinney, 33 Ohio St. 422 (1878); French v. Millard, 2 Ohio
St. 44 (1853); Bucklin v. State, 20 Ohio 18 (1851}; State v.
Rivers, 50 Ohio App_.2d 129, 361 N.E.2d 1363 (Cuyahoga
1977}. In addition, a character witness may be asked if
"from such reputation he would not believe the witness
sought to be impeached under oath." Hillis v. Wylie, 26
Ohio St. 574 (1875) (syllabus). See also State v. Agner, 30
Ohio App.2d 96, 283 N.E.2d 443 (Hancock 1972). Under
the case law, the use of opinion evidence was not permitted. See Cowan v. Kinney, 3305 422 (1878); Bucklin v.
State, 20 Ohio 18 (1851). Rule 608(A) however, changes
the common law and permits the use of opinion
evidence.
Foundational requirements
A foundation mustbe laid showing that the character
witness is acquainted with the reputation of the principal
witness before the character witness is permitted to state
his opinion of that reputation. The Supreme Court
described this foundational requirement in Radke v.
State, 107 Ohio St. 399, 140 N.E. 586 (1923):
[T]he impeaching witness must show on preliminary
examination either that he has for some time lived in
that community or done business in that community, or
some other relation to that community that would qualify him to speak as to the community's general opinion
touching the reputation of the party sought to be
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impeached. The preliminary qualifications of the
impeaching witness must be such as to advise the
court and the jury that he has the means of knowing
such general reputation of the witness sought to be
impeached in the community in which the witness
lives. /d. (syllabus, para. 1).
See also State v. Rivers, 50 Ohio App.2d 129,361 N.E.2d
1363 (Cuyahoga 1977). The community in which reputation is based may be "any substantial community of
people among whom [the principal witness] is well
known, such as the group with whom he works, does
business, or goes to school." McCormick, Evidence 103
(3d ed. 1984). A similar foundation is required before a
witness may express an opinion concerning the principal
witness' character for truth and veracity. The inquiry,
however, focuses on the character witness' relationship
with the principal witness rather than on reputation in the
community.

also held, however, that an ordinanc.e violation was not a
"crime" within the meaning of the statute. See State v.
Arrington, 42 Ohio St.2d 114, 326 N.E.2d 667 (1975);
Harper v. State, 106 Ohio St. 481, 140 N.E. 364 (1922);
Coble v. State, 31 Ohio St. 100 (1876).
Thus, Rule 609(A) changed the prior law in two
respects. Most misdemeanors, admissible under prior
law, are no longer admissible unless they involve crimes
of dishonesty or false statement. Ordinance violations,
however, which were excluded under prior law, are now
admissible if they involve crimes of dishonesty or false
statements. In addition, Rule 609(8) changes prior Ohio
law by placing a time limitation on the use of prior convictions. Generally, convictions over ten years old are inadmissible under that provision.
According to the Ohio Supreme Court, a prior conviction in which pronouncement of sentence is still pending
may be used for impeachment pursuant to Rule 609(A).
State v. Cash; 40 Ohio St.3d 116 (1988). See also 3
Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence§ 323, at 373-74
(1979).

PRIOR CONVICTIONS
Rule 609 governs the admissibility of evidence of prior
convictions offered for the purpose of impeachment.
Rule 609 applies only when a prior conviction is offered
to impeach a witness by showing character for untruthfulness. The admissibility of specific instances of conduct
that have not resulted in a conviction is governed by Rule
608(8), not Rule 609. If the evidence is offered under an
impeachment theory other than character, Rule 609 does
not apply. For example, evidence of a conviction may be
admitted to show that the witness has received or expects
to receive favorable treatment by the prosecution. Such
evidence shows bias and is not governed by Rule 609.
Moreover, evidence of prior conduct that has resulted in
conviction may be admissible for reasons other than
impeachment. for example, eyidence of ''otb.E:lJ crimes"
may be admissible under Rule 404(8) as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, and so forth.
When evidence of a prior conviction is admitted, a
limiting instruction is required upon request of a party.
See Rule 105; Ohio Jury Instructions§ 405.22.

Appellate Review
In Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83
L. Ed.2d 443 (1984), the defendant moved in limine to
prevent the prosecution from using a prior conviction to
impeach him. His motion was based on Federal Rule
609(a). The trial court denied the motion but indicated
that the nature of Luce's trial testimony might affect its
ruling. Luce, however, did not testify at trial. He was convicted and appealed.
On review, the Supreme Court ruled that Luce had
failed to preserve the issue for appeal because he had
not testified at trial: "We hold that to raise and preserve
for review the ch1im of improper impeachment with a
prior conviction, a defendant must testify." /d. at 43. The
Court set forth several reasons for its ruling. First, Federal Rule 609(a) requires the trial court to balance the
probative value of the prior conviction for impeachment
purposes against its prejudicial effect. Such an evalua~
tion, in the Court's view, is impossible without knowing
the precise nature of the defendant's testimony. Second,
if the trial court's decision to admit the evidence is
erroneous, an appellate court is handicapped in making
the required harmless error determination without knowing the nature of the defendant's testimony.

Policy
Rule 609 deals with the impeachment use of character
evidence. It recognizes that specific instances of conduct
that have resulted in a conviction may be used to show
untruthful character. The principal issue in drafting a
provision such as HuiE:l {)09 i~ <;l~tE:lrmining .which crimes
reflect untruthful character. For example, a prior conviction for driving while intoxicated reveals very little about a
person's character for truthfulness, although it may
reveal other things about that person's character.
Rule 609(A) limits the types of convictions that are
admissible for the purpose of impeachment to (1) crimes
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year and (2) crimes of dishonesty and false statement,
regardless of punishment. These limitations were not
recognized under prior Ohio law. For example, RC
2945.42 provides that conviction of a crime "may be
shown for the purpose of affecting the credibility of [a]
witness." In State v. Murdock, 172 Ohio St. 221, 174
N.E.2d 543 (1961), the Supreme Court interpreted that
provision as permitting the admission in evidence of all
prior convictions, including misdemeanors. The Court

Crimes punishable by death or one year imprisonment
Rule 609(A)(1) provides that evidence of prior convictions involving crimes punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year is admissible for impeachment.
Convictions adjudged under federal law as well as the
laws of other states fall within the rule. The authorized
maximum punishment, rather than the actual punishment imposed, is determinative.
The Ohio rule differs from Federal Rule 609(a)(1) in one
important respect. The federal rule contains the additional requirement that prior convictions falling within this
category are admissible only if the "court determines that
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect to the defendant." Thus, a federal
court has discretion to exclude the evidence even if the
prior conviction involves a crime punishable by death or
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imprisonment in excess of one year.
In contrast, Ohio Rule 609(A) appears to provide that
convictions falling within this category are automatically
admissible. The deletion of the discretionary language
contained in the federal rule supports this construction.
The Staff Note, however, includes language that indicates that a trial court retains discretion to exclude evidence
of prior convictions that fall within this category. The Staff
Note, after referring to the discretion recognized in the
federal rule, states: "In limiting that discretionary grant,
Rule 609(A) is directed to greater uniformity in application subject only to the provisions of Rule 403. The
removal of the reference to the defendant insures that the
application of the rule is not limited to criminal prosecutions." This passage suggests that the drafters were
concerned not with eliminating discretion but rather with
its uniform application. This reading is supported by the
Staff Note citation of Rule 403, which provides that the
exclusion of relevant evidence is mandatory if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the
jury. See Blakey, A Short Introduction to the Ohio Rules of
Evidence, 10 Capital L. Rev. 237,256-57 (1980).

testimony: If the defendant is the only person who can
provide defense evidence, the need for his testimony is
greater, and the argument for exclusion of the prior
conviction is stronger.
Fifth, the importance or centrality of credibility in the
case: For example, if the case boils down to a "swearing
contest," it is more important for the jury to know of any
evidence affecting credibility, and the argument for
admission of the prior conviction is greater. See 3
Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence§ 316 (1979); 3
Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's Evidence~ 609[03] (1987).

Crimes of dishonesty and false statement
Rule 609(A)(2) provides that evidence of prior convictions involving crimes of dishonesty and false statement
is admissible for impeachment. Convictions falling into
this category are automatically admissible; the trial court
has no discretion to exclude these convictions. The
Conference Report on Federal Rule 609 contains the
following comment: "The admission of prior convictions
involving dishonesty and false statement is not within the
discretion of the Court. Such convictions are peculiarly
probative of credibility and, under this rule, are always to
be admitted." H.R. Rep. No. 1597, 93d Gong. 2d Sess,
reprinted in [1974) U.S. Code Gong. & Ad. News 7098,
7103. See United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277, 279 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 985, 101 S.Ct. 403, 66
L.Ed.2d 248 (1980).
The principal issue in applying this rule is determining
what types of crimes involve "dishonesty" and "false
statement." The Conference Report also contains a
comment on this issue:
By the phrase "dishonesty and false statement" the
Conference means crimes such as perjury or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other offense in the
nature of crimen falsi, the commission of which
involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or
falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to
testify truthfully. /d.
In addition to the crimes enumerated above, a forgery
conviction would be admissible under Rule 609(A)(2).
State v. Taliaferro, 2 Ohio App.3d 405, 2 O.B.R. 481, 442
N.E.2d 481 (Franklin 1981). On the other hand, crimes
involving violence and controlled substances are not
generally encompassed by the rule. See State v. Ellis, 8
Ohio App.3d 27, 8 O.B.R. 29, 455 N.E.2d 1025 (Franklin
1982) (misdemeanor assault conviction inadmissible).
Several Ohio cases mention the term crimen falsi. See
Webb v. State, 29 Ohio St. 351, 358 (1876) (crimen falsi
includes "forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury, and
offenses affecting the public administration of justice.");
State v. Hickman, 102 Ohio App. 78, 83, 141 N.E.2d 202
(Erie 1956) ("In the common law, the term, 'crimen falsi,'
contains the elements of falsehood and fraud."). In
discussing that term in Kornreich v. Industrial Fire Insurance Co, 132 Ohio St. 78, 5 N.E.2d 153 (1936), the
Supreme Court remarked: "The nature of the offense of
assault and battery in no wise reflects upon credibility."
/d. at 90.
Although theft offenses are typically thought to involve
dishonesty, it is not clear, in light of the legislative history
of the rule, whether evidence of such offenses is admissible

If the rule permits the trial court to exclude evidence of
prior convictions, several factors should affect that decision. These factors·are drawn from Luck v. United States,
348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965), and its progeny, which were
concerned with the dilemma facing a criminal defendant
who has a record of prior convictions.
The accused, who has a "record" but who thinks he
has a defense to the present charge, is thus placed in
a grievous dilemma. If he stays off the stand, his
silence alone will prompt the jury to believe him guilty.
If he elects to testify, his "record" becomes prov3ble to
impeach him, and this again is likely to doom his defense. McCormick, Evidence§ 43, at 99 (3d ed. 1984).
The solution to this dilemma, according to Luck, is to
recognize the trial court's discretion to exclude evidence
of prior convictions. Only if the probative value of the
prior conviction outweighs the unfair prejudice to the
defendant is the evidence admissible. A leading case is
Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029,88 S.Ct. 1421,20 L.Ed.2d 287
(1968). Gordon specified five factors which are to be
considered in determining admissibility.
First, the nature of the offense: A prior conviction that
bears upon veracity has high probative value. In contrast,
conviction of a crime of violence has little probative
value. Convictions involving crimes of dishonesty or false
statement, however, are governed by Rule 609(A)(2).
Second, the remoteness of the conviction: A one-year
old conviction is more probative than an eight-year old
conviction. Convictions more than ten years old, however,
are _subject to the special limitations of Rule 609(B).
Third, the similarity between the prior offense and the
charged offense: If a defendant is charged with a narcotics offense, evidence of a prior narcotics conviction is
more prejudicial than evidence of a prior larceny conviction. The jury is more likely to use the prior narcotics
conviction as evidence of character to commit narcotics
offenses rather than as evidence of untruthful character.
Fourth, the importance of and need tor the defendant's
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under this provision. See 3 Louisell & Mueller, Federal
Evioerrce§-317;-af336=i!Z(1979};·3·weinsrein &Berger,
Weirist~fn's E:videnc(l ,609[03) (1987). Several federal
courts have adopted a restrictive vi~wof the term
"dishonesfy.''S.Eie United States v. Grandmont, 680 F.2d
867, ~71 (ist.Qir, J~~~HriJ!Jbery is nota crime of dishonesty
absent a showing thatflie crime was committed by
deceitful or.Jraudul~ntmeans); United States v. Glenn,
667 F.2d 1269,· 1273 (9thCir. 1982) (crimes of violence,
theft or stealth do not involve dishonesty or false statement unlesspommitted by fraudulent ordeceitful means).
In contrast, several Ohio courts have interpreted this
provision to.permitiJ]Jpeachment vvitb~rnl~.de,meanor
convictions for petty theft. State v. Tolliver, 33 Ohio
App.3d 110, 514 N.E:.2d~?2 ((3uernsey 1986); Middleburg
Heights v~ Theiss, 28Qhio App.3d 1, 5, 28 O.B.R. 9, 501
N.E.2d 1226{Cuyaflogaj985); Stafe Johnson, 10 Ohio
App.3d 14, 14~16, 10 O.B.R. 20,460 N.E.2d 625 (Franklin
1983); State v. Taliaferro, 2 Ohio App.3d 405, 2 O.B.R.
481, 442 N.E.2d 481 (Franklin 1981}.

substantially bears on the credibility of the witness.
* * *

It is intended that convictions over 10 years old will
be admitted very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances. The rules provide that the decision be
supported by specific facts and circumstances thus
requiring the court to make specific findings on the
record as to the particular facts and circumstances it
has considered in determining that the probative value
of the conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial
impact. S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Gong. 2d Sess., reprint_gg'jnJl~Z41 lJ.q~ (:;od~J~ong. & Ad. News 7051, 7061,
7062 (emphasis added).
See also State v. Ellis, 8 Ohio App.3d 27, 29,8 O.B.R. 29,
455 N.E.2d 1025 (Franklin 1982) (record does not
support a finding under Evid. R. 609(8)).
The notice requirement was added to the federal rule
by the Conference Committee. That Committee provided
the following explanation: "The Conferees anticipate that
a written notice, in order to give the adversary a fair opportunity to contest the use of the evidence, will ordinarily include such information as the date of the conviction,
the jurisdiction, and the offense or statute involved. In
order to eliminate the possibility that the flexibility of this
provision may impair the ability of a party-opponent to
prepare for trial, the Conferees intend that the notice
provision operate to avoid surprise." H.R. Rep. No. 1597,
93d Gong. 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974) U.S. Code Gong.
& Ad. News 7098,7103.

v.

Time limit
Rule 609(B)provides that evidence of a prior conviction that satisfies the criteria of Rule 609{A) is nevertheless inadmissible if rnore than ten years has elapsed
since the date of(1) conviction, (2) r~lea~€l from confinement, or (3)termination of probation, shock probation,
parole, or shock parole, "whichever is the later date.'' The
rule, however, does recognize an exception. Such convictions may be admissible if the proponent provides sufficient!ldVCince written fiOtice tothe adverse party and the
court determines, based upon "specific facts and circumstances,'' th~t the probative value of the evidence
sul;>stantilil._ll~iPY.twejgh~itspreju,dicial ettect. See Annat.,
43 A.L.R. Fed. 398 (1979).
The ten,year.Jimitation·representsachange in Ohio
law. The rafiollale for this limitation is that convictions so
remote in time are no longer relevant in assessing a
witness' credibility.
The rule differs from Federal Rule 609(b) to the extent
that computation of the time limit may be based on probation or parole termination dates in addition to the date
of conviction or release from confinement. The time period coinrnences at whichever date occurs last. The termination of parole and probation are gqvernecl by statu~e.
See RC 295l.O( (probC1tion); RC 2947.061 (shock probation); RC 2967.16 (parole); RC 2967.31 (shock parole).
The·pointatwhich the·time period ends--:date of
indictment, date of trial, or date witness testifies-is
unclear. See 3 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence§
320, at 353,(1Q7~).1n State v. Chambers, 2:1 Ohio App.3d
99, 21 O.B.R. 106, 486 N.E.2d 1163 (Cuyahoga 1984), the
court wrote: '[T)he time limit would apply to the date upon
which the witness testifies." /d. at 100.

Method of proving prior convictions
Prior convictions that are admissible under Rule 609
may be elicited from the witness on cross-examination or
established by public record during cross-examination.
According to State v. Hewit, 26 Ohio App.3d 72,26 O.B.R.
246, 498N.E.2d 215 (Shelby 1985), the record of conviction also may be admitted during the state's rebuttal.
Cross-examination
Permitting cross-examination of a witness concerning
a prior conviction is consistent with pre-Rules cases. In
State v. Arrington, 42 Ohio St.2d 114,326 N.E.2d 667
(1975), the Supreme Court stated: "[T]he general rule
established by a line of unanimous decisions of this court
is that the defendant may be cross-examined as to his
conviction of a crime under state or federal laws for the
purpose of testing credibility." /d. at 120. Accord, State v.
Kaiser, 56 Ohio St.2d 29,381 N.E.2d 633 (1978).
Although the rule does not specify the amount of detail
concerning the prior conviction that may be elicited on
cross-examination, the "generally prevailing" practice is
that "the name of the crime, the time and place of conviction, and the punishment" is admissible, but "details
such as the name of the victim and the aggravating
circumstances" are not. McCormick, Evidence § 43, at
98 (3d ed. 1984). The Supreme Court has written:
We therefore hold that under Evid. R. 609, a trial court
has broad discretion to limit any questioning of a
witness on cross-examination which asks more than
the name of the crime, the time and place of conviction
and the punishment imposed, when the conviction is
admissible solely to impeach general credibility. State

The exception
The exception that grants authority to the trial court to
admit convictions that are more than ten years old was
added to Federal Rule 609(b) by the Senate Judiciary
Committee:
Although convictions over ten years old generally do
not have much probative value, there may be exceptional circumstances under which the conviction
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v. Amburgey, 33 Ohio St.3d 115, 117, 515 N.E.2d 925
(1987).
See also State v. Shields, 15 Ohio App.3d 112, 113, 15
O.B.R. 202,472 N.E.2d 1110 (Cuyahoga 1984); State v.
Fricke, 13 Ohio App.3d 331, 333, 13 O.B.R. 409, 469
N.E.2d 1035 (Hamilton 1984); State v. Hill, 111 Ohio App.
257,259, 165 N.E.2d 241 (Hamilton 1959).
The rule uses the term "cross-examination." This
provision, however, must be read in conjunction with
Rule 607, which permits a party to impeach its own
witnesses. Thus, it is proper to elicit prior conviction
evidence during direct examination. Moreover, the rule
should not be interpreted as barring counsel from bringing out evidence of prior convictions on direct examination "for the purpose of lessening the import of these
convictions upon the jury." State v. Peoples, 28 Ohio
App.2d 162, 168, 275 N.E.2d 626 (Mahoning 1971).
The questioning of a criminal defendant about prior
convictions in the absence of proof of such convictions
has been condemned. See State v. Cox, 42 Ohio St.2d
200, 207, 327 N.E.2d 639 (1975) (prejudicial error toquestion defendant "regarding prior convictions, without at
some point in the trial offering proof thereof."); State v.
Crawford, 17 Ohio App.2d 141,244 N.E.2d 774 (Hamilton
1969); State v. Cole, 107 Ohio App. 444, 155 N.E.2d 507
(Hamilton 1958). The leading case is Wagner v. State, 115
Ohio St. 136, 152 N.E. 28 (1926), in which the Supreme
Court commented:
It is evident that the state had no information concerning any such convictions. Manifestly these questions
were asked for the sole purpose of discrediting Wagner before the jury ... When the state has no such
further evidence, or produces none, then questions of
his character become incompetent for any purpose,
and, when counsel for the state knows that no convictions attended the indictments inquired about, then
this line of cross-examination is wholly unfair, and is
highly prejudicial to the accused. !d. at 137.

such prior conviction together with evidence sufficient
to identify the defendant named in the entry as the
offender in the case at bar, is sufficient to prove such
prior conviction.
Witness' explanation
The rule does not specify whether a witness
impeached with a prior conviction may offer some type of
explanatory comment. McCormick recognized that a
"substantial number of courts, while not opening the
door to a retrial of the conviction, do permit the witness
himself to make a brief and general statement in explanation, mitigation, or denial of guilt, or recognize a discretion in the trial judge to permit it." McCormick, Evidence
§ 43, at 99 (3d ed. 1984).
In Harper v. State, 106 Ohio St. 481, 140 N.E. 364
(1922), the Supreme Court may have rejected this view.
"Such record [of conviction], unmodified or unreversed,
may neither be impeached nor contradicted by the
defendant, or any other witness in his behalf." /d. (syllabus, para. 4). However, in State v. Kirkland, 18 Ohio
App.3d 1, 18 O.B.R. 25,480 N.E.2d 85 (Cuyahoga 1984),
the court wrote:
The rule itself does not specify whether a witness may
offer explanatory comment. See P. Giannelli, Ohio
Rules (1982) .... However, the admission of any
collateral evidence which relates to the credibility of a
witness' testimony lies within the discretion of the trial
court ... We reject the rigidity of Harper v. State./d. at 4.
Effect of pardon, annulment, or expungement
Rule 609(C) provides that evidence of a prior conviction is inadmissible if the conviction has been the subject
of a pardon, annulment, expungement, certificate of
rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a
"finding of rehabilitation," provided the witness has not
been convicted of a subsequent crime punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year. In addition,
evidence of a prior conviction is inadmissible if the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment,
expungement, or other equivalent procedure "based on
a finding of innocence." See An not, 42 A .L.A. Fed. 942
(1979).
The policy underlying this provision is stated in the
Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 609:
A pardon or its equivalent granted solely for the
purpose of restoring civil rights lost by virtue of a
conviction has no relevance to an inquiry into
character. If, however, the pardon or other proceeding
is hinged upon a showing of rehabilitation the situation
is otherwise. The result under the rule is to render the
conviction inadmissible. The alternative of allowing in
evidence both the conviction and the rehabilitation
has not been adopted for reasons of policy, economy
of time, and difficulties of evaluation.
Pardons based on innocence have the effect, of
course, of nullifying the conviction ab initio.
The House Judiciary Committee added the following
comment on this provision: "The Committee ... intends
that the words 'based on a finding of the rehabilitation of
the person convicted' apply not only to 'certificate of
rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure', but also to
'pardon' and 'annulment.'" H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d

Record of conviction
The pre-Rules cases recognized that records of prior
conviction are admissible. In Harper v. State, 106 Ohio
St. 481, 140 N.E. 364 (1922), the Supreme Court held
that if "the defendant denies his conviction of such
crime, the proper record of the conviction, duly authenticated, may be offered by the state in rebuttal." /d. (syllabus, para. 3). Although Rule 609 does not require a prior
denial as a prerequisite for admissibility of conviction
records, it does limit the admissibility of extrinsic
evidence to records of conviction. This is consistent with
McCormick's view. "Here the cross-examiner need not
'lay a foundation' for proof by copy or record, nor is he
bound to 'take the answer' if the witness denies the
conviction, but may prove it by the record." McCormick,
Evidence§ 43 at 97 (3d ed. 1984).
A hearsay exception for judgments of previous convictions is recognized in Rule 803(21). A record of a prior conviction also would qualify as a public record under Rule
803(8) (hearsay exception), is often self-authenticating
under Rule 902, and copies are admissible under Rule 1005
(best evidence rule). In addition, RC 2945.75(8) provides:
Whenever in any case it is necessary to prove a prior
conviction, a certified copy of the entry of judgment in
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Gong. 1~! $e§s. (197_3),,ree!if2ted in [1974] U.S. Code
Gong. & Ad. News 7075, 7085.
Except for the addition of the term "expungement," the
rule is identical to Federal Rule 609(c). This addition was
made because several Ohio statutes contain expungement provisions. See RC 2953.31 to 2953.36 (first offenders);
RC 2151.358 Ouveniles); Comment, Expungement in
Ohio: Assimilation into Society for the Former Criminal, 8
Akron L. Rev. 480 (1975). Ohio does not have an annulment or rehabilitation procedure, but the rule recognizes
such procedures if adopted by other jurisdictions.

L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), finding that the exclusion of evidence
of a prosecution witness' juvenile probationary status
violated the right of confrontation. It should be noted that
neither Davis nor Cox involved the use of a juvenile
adjudication to show untruthful character; in Davis the
evidence was offered to show bias, and in Cox the
evidence was offered to show contradiction and probably
was admissible on the merits as well. Thus, these two
cases would not have been controlled by Rule 609 in any
event. See also State v. White, 6 Ohio App.3d 1, 6 O.B.R.
23, 451 N.E.2d 533 (Cuyahoga 1982) (distinguishing
Davis and Cox).

Juvenile adjudications·
In contrast to the federal rule, Rule 609(0) provides
that evidence of a juvenile adjudication offered to
impeach a witness is not admissible "except as provided
by statute enacted by the General Assembly." This rule
was amended to its present form in 1980 because the
drafters considered the question of admissibility of
juvenile adjudications to be substantive, and therefore
beyond the Supreme Court's n,.rlernaking authority. See
Giannelli, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The
General Assembly, Evidence, and Rufemaking, 29 Case
W.R. L. Rev. 16, 55 n. 207 (1978).

Pendency of appeal
Rule 609(E) provides that the pendency of an appeal
does not affect the admissibility of evidence of a prior
conviction. Evidence that an appeal is pending, however,
is admissible and may affect the weight accorded to the
prior conviqtion.
The rationale for this provision is set forth in the Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 609(e): "The
presumption of correctness which ought to attend judicial proceedings supports the position that pendency of
an appeal does not preclude use of a conviction for
impeachment ... The pendency of an appeal is, however, a qualifying circumstance properly considerable."
According to the Staff Note, Rule 609(E) "is in accord
with prior Ohio law."

RC 2151.358(H) governs the admissibility of juvenile
adjudications. It provides, in part:
The disposition of a child under the judgment rendered
or any evidence given in court is not admissible as
evidence against the child in any other case or proceeding in any other court, except that the judgment
rendered and the disposition of the child may be
considered by any court only as to the matter of
sentence or to the granting of probation.
In Malone v. State, 130 Ohio St. 443, 200 N.E. 473 (1936),
the Supreme Court inter.preteda.predecessor statute as
precluding the impeachment use of juvenile adjudications. "Motivated by a humanitarian impulse, the law
prohibits the use of Juvenile Court proceedings, or of
proof developed thereon, against a child in any other
court to discredit him or to mark him as one possessing a
criminal history." /d. at 453-54. Accord, Mason v. Klaserner, 114 Ohio App. 171, 180 N.E.2d 870 (Franklin 1961).
See also Beatty v. Riegel, 115 Ohio App. 448, 185 N.E.2d
555 (Montgomery 1961).

Unconstitutional convictions
In Loper v. Beta, 405 U.S. 473, 92 S.Ct. 1014, 31
L.Ed.2d 374 (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
impeachment use of a conviction based upon a trial in
which the defendant was denied the right to counsel
violates due process. The right to counsel violation in
Loper was based upon Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). The Gideon principle was extended subsequently to any criminal trial in
which imprisonment is imposed. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006,32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972).
See also Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585,
64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980). Once the validity of a prior conviction is raised, the prosecution has the burden of establishing that the right to counsel requirements were met.
See United States v. Lewis, 486 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1973).
See generally 3 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence§
324 (1979); 3 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's Evidence
~609[11] (1987).

Rule 609 applies only when a prior conviction is
offered to impeach a witness by showing character for
truth and veracity. lfthe evidence is offered for some
other purpose, the rule does not apply, although the statute may apply. The courts, however, have recognized
several exc(3ptions toRC 2151.358. In State v. Cox, 42
Ohio St.2d 200, 327 N.E.2d 639 (1975), the Supreme
Court held that the statute could not prevent a criminal
defendant from impeaching a key government witness.
Although the General Assembly may enact legislation
to ·effectuate its policy of protecting the confidentiality
of juvenile records, such enactment may not impinge
upon the right of a defendant in a criminal case to present all available, relevant and probative evidence
which is pertinent to a specific and material aspect of
his defense. /d. at 204.

Indictments and arrests
Evidence that a witness has been arrested or indicted
may not be used to impeach if the evidence is offered
only to show the witness' bad character. The conduct that
is the basis for the arrest or indictment, however, may be
admissible pursuant to Rule 608(B). Moreover, the
evidence may be admissible if the impeachment is
based on bias. State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St.2d 167, 249
N.E.2d 912 (1969); Keveney v. State, 109 Ohio St. 64, 141
N.E. 845 (1923).
SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT
Rule 608(B) provides that on cross-examination a

The United States Supreme Court reached the same
result in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39
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witness may be asked, subject to the trial court's
discretion, about specific instances of conduct which are
clearly probative of the witness' character for truthfulness. Extrinsic evidence of such conduct, however, may
:c not be admitted; for example, the testimony of other
:-·. witnesses who may have observed the conduct is
inadmissible even if the witness denies the conduct on
cross-examination. "[l]f the answers received on crossexamination do not satisfy the examiner, it is said that the
examiner is bound by or 'stuck' with the responses."
State v. Leuin, 11 Ohio St.3d 172,174, 11 O.B.R. 486, 464
N.E.2d 552 (1984). See also State v. Kamel, 12 Ohio St.3d
306,310-11, 12Q.B.R. 378,466 N.E.2d 860 (1984) (error
to admit extrinsic evidence).

Determining admissibility
. The admissibility of evidence pursuant to Rule 608(B)
IS entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. This
approach represents a compromise between permitting
a wide-ranging inquiry into specific instances of conduct
and permitting no inquiry whatsoever. According to
McCormick, the "latter view is arguably the fairest and
most expedient practice because of the dangers otherwise of prejudice (particularly if the witness is a party), of
distraction and confusion, of abuse by the asking of unfounded questions, and of the difficulties ... of ascertaining whether particular acts relate to character for
truthfulness:' McCormick, Evidence § 42, at 90-91 (3d
ed. 1984}.
Although the rule permits the use of specific instances
of conduct to impeach, the problems recognized by
McCormick and the language of the rule suggest that a
strong showing must be made before admissibility is
warranted. As the Advisory Committee's Note to Federal
Rule 608 indicates, the trial court's decision to admit
such evidence is governed generally by Rule 403. "[T)he
overriding protection of Rule 403 requires that probative
value not be outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, and that of
Rule 611 bars harassment and undue embarrassment."
In this context, however, Rule 403 must be read in light of
Rule 608, which imposes tighter restraints on admissibility. Only evidence relevant to truth and veracity is admissible. In addition, unlike Rule 403, Rule 608 requires the
evidence to be "clearly" probative. The word "clearly"
does not appear in the federal version of Rule 608,
although it did appear in the revised draft of the Federal
Rules. See 51 F.R.D. 389 (1971). The word "clearly" was
inserted in the Ohio rule in order to require "a high
degree of probative value of instances of prior conduct as
to truthfulness or untruthfulness of the witness." Staff Note.

Whether the pre-Rules cases permitted this type of
impeachment is unclear. The Staff Note to Rule 608(B)
cites State Browning, 98 Ohio App. 8, 128 N.E.2d 173
(Hamilton 1954), to support its contention that the rule is
consistent with prior Ohio law. Several other cases also
support this contention. See State v. Osborne, 50 Ohio
St.2d 211, 218,364 N.E.2d 216 (1977), vacated on other
grounds, 438 U.S. 911,98 S.Ct. 3137, 57 L.Ed.2d 1157
(1978} (''Appellant's admission that ... he lied to the
police is singularly relevant and admissible as bearing
upon his credibility."); Fawick Airflex Co. v. United
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, 56
Abs. 419, 421, 92 N.E.2d 431 (App. Cuyahoga 1950)
("[A] witness on cross-examination may be asked
questions tending to disclose his own character and may
be interrogated on specific acts ... if they have a
legitimate bearing upon his credit as a witness."). Other
, cases, however, reached the opposite result. See State v.
' Schecter [Schechter), 47 Ohio App.2d 113, 121, 352
N.E.2d 617 (Cuyahoga 1974), affirmed by 44 Ohio St.2d
188,339 N.E.2d 654 (1975) ("A witness can never be
irhpeacliedthrough evidence of specific instances of bad
character whether related to truthfulness or otherwise.");
Brice v. Samuels, 59 Ohio App. 9, 14, 17 N.E.2d 280
(Hamilton 1938) ("[W]e know of no rule under which
specific acts of wrongdoing may be admitted to affect the
credibility of a witness:').

v:

Wigmore favored limiting admissibility to "only such
misconduct as indicates a Jack of veracity-fraud,
forgery, perjury, and the like." 3A Wigmore, Evidence§
983, at 840 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). A number of preRules Ohio cases appear to be consistent with this
approach. A witness' falsification of an application for a
marriage license would be admissible under Rule 608.
See State v. Porter, 14 Ohio St.2d 10, 235 N.E.2d 520
(1968). An admission by the witness that he lied to the
police during the investigation of the crime would also
qualify under Rule 608 because it relates directly to the
veracity of the witness and because it is undisputed. See
State v. Osborne, 50 Ohio St.2d 211,218,364 N.E.2d 216
(1977), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct.
3137, 57 L.Ed.2d 1157 (1978}. See also Plas v. Holmes
Construction Co, 157 Ohio St. 95, 104 N.E.2d 689 (1952};
State v. Cochrane, 151 Ohio St. 128, 84 N.E.2d 742 (1949)
(excluding other acts); Wagner v. State, 115 Ohio St. 136,
152 N.E. 28 (1926} (excluding evidence of indictments);
James v. Franks, 15 Ohio App.2d 215, 240 N.E.2d 508
(Montgomery 1968} (indictments); 3 Louisell & Mueller,
Federal Evidence§§ 225-34 (1979).

Rule 608(B) is not a bar to admissibility if evidence is
relevant for some purpose other than character. In
United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83
L.Ed.2d 450 (1984), the prosecution offered extrinsic
evidence showing that the defendant and a defense
witness were members of a secret prison gang which
had a creed requiring its members to deny its existence
and lie for each other. The defendant argued, inter alia,
that the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 608(b)
because it was not sufficiently probative of truthfulness
and was introduced by extrinsic evidence, i.e., through
the testimony of a prosecution witness. Without deciding
whether the evidence satisfied the requirements of
Rule 608(b), the Court held the evidence admissible for
the purpose of impeachment by bias. According to the
Court, "there is no rule of evidence which provides that
testimony admissible for one purpose and inadmissible
for another purpose is thereby rendered inadmissible;
quite the contrary is the case." /d. at 56. See also
State v. Williams, 21 Ohio St.3d 33, 21 O.B.R. 320, 487
N.E.2d 560 (1986) (evidence relevant to an element of the
crime).

Cases decided under the Evidence Rules also have
limited admissibility to conduct relevant to untruthful
character. See State v. Mann, 19 Ohio St.3d 34, 19 O.B.R.
28, 482 N.E.2d 592 (1985) (violation of a civil injunction
not admissible); State v. Rodriquez, 31 Ohio App.3d 174,
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31 QJig-~~~,_ §Q_~J't~~?!!~_!?.?JbQX?l!:1_1!:l§f:l) (evidence of
p6~~~$~i(:il) of rfii!friji.Jana notadmissible); State v. Tolliver,
16 Ohio App.3d 120, 16 O.B.R. 126, 474 N.E.2d 642
(CtJy~IJgg?:JJ~_I:I-4)(gyjg~nce of sex change not admissible).See Statev. Greer, 39 Ohio St 3d 236, 243 (1988)
(violation of parole constitutes a specific instance of failure to keep his word).
The "remoteness" of the evidence also affects its
relevancy. As proposed by the U.S. Supreme Court, Rule
608 required that the evidence "not [be] remote in time."
56 F. A.D. 201 (1973). Notwithstanding the deletion of this
phrase from the rule as adopted, remoteness is a factor
affecting-admissibility,-See State v. Scott, 61 Ohio St2d
155, 164; 400 N.E.2d 375 (1980) ("[T]he trial court could
have reasonably concluded that at the time of testimony
the nine-year qlcl finding W?l3 tq9 remot~ to be relevant.").
Even if the evidence has a high degree of probative

value, the trial court must weigh the probative value
against the accompanying dangers of unfair prejudice,
confusion of issues, and misleading the jury. It is important to note that, unlike Federal Rule 403, Ohio Rule
403(A) makes exclusion mandatory if the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the accompanying dangers.
The danger of unfair prejudice is especially acute if the
defendant in a criminal case is the witness whose credibility is attacked under Rule 608(8).
Finally, the party inquiring into specific instances of conduct must have a good faith basis for asking the question.
This is especially true in criminal cases where the unfair
prejudice may be great In Watkins v. Foster, 570 F.2d 501
(4th Cir. 1978), the Fourth Circuit held that the prosecution's questions concerning prior bad acts, offered to
impeach the defendant, violated due process where the
evidentiary foundation for such questions was insufficient.
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